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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Banking and Finance at the International 
Hellenic University.  
This study investigates how three types of ownership- family, government and foreign- affect 
a firm’s tax aggressiveness. The sample is consisted of Greek listed firms during 2012-2015. 
The measure of tax aggressiveness that it is used in this study is effective tax rate. My 
hypotheses are that family firms and government-controlled firms are less likely to enhance 
tax aggressive policies while on the other hand foreign firms are more likely to be related to 
tax avoidance. However, I conclude that the effective tax rate as tax measurement cannot 
function sufficiently in the context of the Greek market. Thus, my hypotheses cannot be 
tested.  
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1 Introduction 
At this paragraph, we introduce the research topic. Initially, a general portrayal of the 
topic and the background is provided. The research question is following, which is 
founded on the information given in the background section. Finally, the incentives of 
the research are given, alongside with the contribution.  
1.1 Background  
It is observed an increased and widespread interest regarding the grounds, causes, 
decisive factors, importance and consequences of tax avoidance in the recent research 
area of accounting (Desai, Dyck and Zingales, 2007; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Jacob, 
Rohlfing-Bastian and Sandner, 2014). Many studies have been conducted especially 
over the repercussions and the measures of corporate tax avoidance. Specifically, 
Christensen and Murphy (2004) argue that tax avoidance on a large scale enables 
companies to become economic free-riders, enjoying the benefits of corporate 
citizenship without accepting the costs, while also causing harmful market distortions 
and transferring a larger share of the tax burden onto individual tax payers and 
consumers (Christensen, Murphy, 2004) while other researchers aspire to find 
adequate measures of corporate tax avoidance (Hanlon, Heitzman, 2010; Salihu, Obid, 
Annuar, 2013). Which are the most adequate ways of measuring corporate tax 
avoidance will be discussed in detail further down as it will be also clarified which 
measure of corporate tax avoidance will be used in this research.  
 Despite the increasing and widespread interest, there are many aspects 
regarding tax avoidance that has not been sufficiently and thoroughly investigated yet. 
That is the reason why corporate tax avoidance is always included in the section of the 
future research questions (Shackelford and Shelvin, 2001; Hanlon and Heitzman, 
2010). The main reason for this shortage of research is the lack of a universal definition 
for the term “corporate tax avoidance”. Corporate tax avoidance might mean 
“different thing to different people” (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010, p. 135).  Thus, 
another challenge of this research, beside comparing the measures of tax avoidance 
to conclude on the most advantageous, is to determine and provide a clear definition 
based on prior literature, so that the results to be interpreted correctly.  
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 Tax avoidance is a topic of great interest not only for financial accounting and 
finance. It’s a topic that concerns and affects a large segment of society especially 
nowadays that many powerful companies, such as Google, Amazon, Hewlett- Packard, 
and wealthy individuals (Panama papers) are being accused for tax avoidance. One of 
the main concerns of companies is public opinion, which is brutally damaged when a 
company is accused for tax avoidance. Therefore, the assumption that tax avoidance 
comes with no costs cannot hold. Except of the damage to corporate income, there 
are other non- tax costs for example litigation costs and brand costs (Scholes, Wolfson, 
Erickson, Maydew and Shevlin, 2005). Despite the above hazards, companies continue 
to avoid taxes. That is why it is interesting to research and understand what types of 
companies avoid taxes and how do they accomplish that. 
 On the other hand, the self- evident must be stated. Corporate tax avoidance 
is constantly increasing despite its costs because it is an expense deduction and 
therefore increases the cash- flow and the wealth of the company and company’s 
investors. Additionally, this deduction lowers the interest tax shield, that should say 
the marginal benefit of this shield, and therefore could change firm’s decision on their 
capital structure (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Graham and Tucker, 2006). 
 These consequences affect along with the company the managers, the 
shareholders, the creditors, the government and all the other stakeholders. Corporate 
tax avoidance is considered a transfer of value from the state to shareholders and a 
boost to the firm value (Desai and Dharmapala, 2005). The potential consequences, 
as it becomes obvious, are many and contradictory. Thus, a thorough research of the 
determinants is behooved.  
 The most frequent- mentioned determinants of corporate tax avoidance are 
manager characteristics, board structure, the scale of the international operations and 
auditor characteristics. This study will focus on the effect of different types of 
corporate ownership structures. Khurana and Moser (2009) conclude that firms with 
higher levels of institutional ownership generally present higher levels of tax 
avoidance. Khurana and Moser also compare long-term institutional ownership and 
short-term institutional ownership and conclude that short-term institutional 
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shareholders apply pressure to the managers into becoming more tax aggressive. To 
come to this conclusion, they used two different proxies, the five-year effective tax 
rate and the yearly permanent book-tax differences reported by a firm. They suggest 
that higher long run cash effective tax rates show less tax aggressiveness by the firm 
while large yearly permanent book-tax differences generally show higher levels of tax 
aggressiveness. On the other hand, Chen et al. (2009) argue that family firms exhibit 
lower tax aggressiveness compared to non- family firms since the impingement of the 
dissimilar characteristics of family owners versus managers in non-family firms is great 
on the profit and losses caused by tax aggressiveness. Family owners seems to be 
more concerned regarding the potential penalties and the reputational damage and 
thus, they prone to be less tax aggressive. Langli and Saudagaran (2003) find that 
foreign controlled corporations develop higher levels of tax avoidance in comparison 
to domestic controlled corporations. From the above, it becomes apparent that 
ownership structure, such as family ownership, government ownership and foreign 
ownership, influence the tax policy of the firm. That is due to the affiliation between 
ownership and control management. Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) state that the 
ownership structure is an understudied determinant of corporate tax avoidance. This 
study will try to illuminate the connection between ownership structure and 
corporate tax avoidance and clarify whether this relation indeed exists.  
1.2 Research Question  
The research Question of this research is:  
“How corporate ownership structure affects corporate tax avoidance?”  
This research will examine the different types of ownership structures, how the 
ownership structure affect corporate tax avoidance and the different measures being 
used to estimate the scale of corporate tax avoidance.  
1.3 Motivation and Contribution  
The impact of this research aims to be, except from scientific, chiefly societal. That is 
because as it is mentioned in the previous section, the consequences of corporate tax 
avoidance affect the body of the society. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, has stated “taxes 
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are what we pay for civilized society”1. Tax revenues are the most vital financing 
instrument for the development and maintenance of physical infrastructure and 
preservation of welfare state and rule of law. Tax avoidance disrupts the balances and 
state financing, making the research of its determinants important and interesting. 
Previous studies have mentioned many determinants of corporate tax avoidance; 
however, this research will focus on the effect of corporate ownership.  
 There have been conducted many studies regarding the determinant of 
corporate ownership. However, most of the previous researches abstract their data 
from Eastern countries like China, Malaysia etc. (Chen et al. 2010; Mahenthiran and 
Kasipillai, 2012; Chan, Mo and Zhou, 2013; Annuar, Salihu and Obid, 2014) and 
countries of Western Europe (Huizinga and Nicodeme, 2006; Eshuis, 2016). This study 
is focused on Greece, a Balkan country, a country of Eastern Europe, whose economy 
has been aggressively affected by financial crisis. There is an articulate need for further 
research in the region of Eastern Europe. This new setting provides a new point of 
view, as both time and region alters.  
 Another reason why Greece is a suitable choice as a country is the 
transferability of the results into other countries around the Mediterranean Sea such 
as Italy and Spain. These are countries that have common ground with Greece 
especially regarding corporate structure, tax policies and economic situation. Previous 
studies have focused on regions with little or no similarities with the countries of 
Eastern and South Europe, making impossible the transfer of their conclusions and 
results into the financial ambience of these countries. 
 Beside the societal point of view, the need for further research and the 
transferability of the results another Greece’s advantage is that corporate ownership 
structure can provide the data that are needed, since there are many family- owned 
firms but also state- owned firms. Especially family ownership is a very common 
ownership structure, a fact that facilitates the raise of data.  
                                                          
1 www.irs.gov 
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 Some other issues and questions that will be illuminated during the study are 
those regarding the definition of tax avoidance. Some questions that I will try to 
answer are: “what is the meaning of the term ‘tax avoidance?”, “what is the difference 
between tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax aggressiveness?”, “is tax avoidance a legal 
activity or not?”. The purpose is to arrive to a general and clear definition.  
 Finally, another issue that is going to concern us in this study is measuring the 
term ‘corporate tax avoidance’. Previous studies have used many different measures 
(Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Chen et al., 2010). Some consider the gap between the 
accounting and the taxable income while others rely on the effective tax rate. Another 
issue is from where the information about these factors could be obtained; from the 
tax returns filed by the company or from the financial statements and company’s 
annual report (Salihu, Obid and Annuar, 2013)?  
 
2 Literature Review 
At this section the relevant literature will be demonstrated. The definitions will be 
clarified and all the questions stated in the previous section will be answered. 
Concluding, the hypotheses that answer the research question are going to be stated 
and discussed.  
2.1 Acceptations and definitions 
As stated above, there are no generally accepted definitions for the terms and 
concepts that concern this study. By using, analyzing and presenting the existing 
literature on these matters, it should be able to provide an understandable and clear 
framework on which I will rely to corroborate the results of this study.  
2.1.1 Definition of tax avoidance 
Terms such as tax management, tax planning and tax aggressiveness have been used 
in the literature to declare tax avoidance. This demonstrates the challenging 
interpretation of the meaning of tax avoidance and its wide view.  
According to Dyreng et al. (2008) tax avoidance is “the ability to pay a low 
amount of tax per dollar of reported pre- tax financial accounting income” (p. 61). 
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Frank et al. (2009) argue in his study that tax avoidance is the “downward 
manipulation of taxable income through tax planning that may or may not be 
considered fraudulent tax evasion” (p. 468). In a broader definition by Chen et al. 
(2010) tax avoidance is viewed to “encompass tax planning activities that are legal, or 
that may fall into the grey area, as well as activities that are illegal" (p. 42).  Tresch 
(2002) separates the two terms, tax avoidance and tax evasion and argues in his study 
that “tax avoidance refers to taxpayers taking advantage of the provisions of the tax 
laws to reduce their tax liability” and concludes that it is a legal activity with certain 
and predictable consequences. On the other hand, per Tresch (2002) “tax evasion 
refers to hiding sources of taxable income from the tax authorities to reduce one's tax 
liability” (p. 512). He characterized it as an illegal activity with uncertain 
consequences.  
 Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) conclude to broader and more integrated 
definition of tax avoidance. They represent tax avoidance “as a continuum of tax 
planning strategies where something like municipal bond investments are at one end 
(lower explicit tax, perfectly legal), then terms such as ‘‘noncompliance,’’ ‘‘evasion,’’ 
‘‘aggressiveness,’’ and ‘‘sheltering’’ would be closer to the other end of the continuum 
(p. 137). A tax planning activity or a tax strategy could be anywhere along the 
continuum depending upon how aggressive the activity is in reducing taxes.” They do 
not distinguish between legal avoidance and illegal evasion first because the legality 
of a tax avoidance transaction is often determined after the fact and second because 
almost always it is ambiguous whether the transaction is permissible or not. They 
agree on that matter with Weisbach (2002) who argues that lawyers and economists 
are too quick to classify ‘‘avoidance’’ as legal tax planning and ‘‘evasion’’ as illegal tax 
planning as if it is something apparent and easy.  
 In this paper, I adapt the definitions of Dyreng et al. (2008) and Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010) as the reduction of explicit taxes.  
2.1.2 Measuring tax avoidance 
Despite the many efforts and studies, there is still lack of an adequate measurement 
construct for the conforming tax avoidance. Hanlon and Heitzman in their review of 
tax research (2010) criticized all the already existing measures for capturing only the 
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non- conforming tax avoidance and proposed a measure for the conforming tax 
avoidance along with twelve (12) utilized measures of corporate tax avoidance in 
previous researches.  
 Salihu, Obid and Annuar (2013) tried in their study “Measures of corporate tax 
avoidance” to provide empirical evidence for or against the proposed measure by 
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) for conforming tax avoidance. They confront the 
question whether this proposed measure is statistically different compare to three 
established measures of corporate tax avoidance, effective tax rate (ETR), book- tax 
gap (the difference between the accounting income and taxable income), and DTAX 
(a measure that Armstrong et al. (2012) uses in his study. Their study showed that the 
four measures have significant differences among them.  
 Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew (2008) recognized that a common factor of most 
established measures is their annual base. Their criticism is that the annual measures 
might include bias, since measuring in annual base does not making clear if the 
avoidance is a year to year phenomenon or not. Thus, they provide a new tool which 
measures avoidance in the long run and clarifies whether firms can avoid taxes over 
longer periods of times. Finally, Badertscher, Katz and Rego (2013) conclude that if 
someone wants to come up with the right results should use more than one different 
measures, because all kind of measures contain errors.  
 In this study, I am going to rely on the effective tax rate measure, which is a 
well- known and commonly- used method of tax avoidance measurement. Many 
researchers have use this measure to date due to its reliability (Chen et al., 2010; 
Mahenthiran and Kasipillai, 2012; Bradshaw et al, 2016).  
2.1.3 Corporate ownership structures 
In this section, the three most important for our study ownership structures will be 
presented. These three ownership structures have emanated from prior literature and 
namely regarding family ownership the literature source is the study of Chen et al. 
(2010), for government ownership I relied on Chan et al. (2013) and Bradshaw, Liao 
and Ma (2016) and finally for foreign ownership I abstracted information from 
Huizinga and Nicodeme (2006). The characteristics of each structure will be analyzed 
12 
 
along with the results and conclusions of the prior literature regarding each structure.  
For constructing the hypotheses that answer the research question of this study.  
2.1.3.1 Family ownership structure 
The first ownership structure that will be studied is the family ownership. To 
determine which are family owned firms and which are non- family owned firms, an 
articulate definition of family ownership is needed. Chen et al. (2010) define family 
firms “as firms where members of the founding family continue to hold positions in 
top management, are on the board, or are blockholders of the company” (p. 42). Chen 
et al. (2010) also argues in his study that family- owned firms originate a different and 
greater agency conflict between large and minority shareholders along with a lesser 
agency conflict between owners and managers compared to non- family firms.  
The difference between family and non- family firms regarding tax avoidance 
is generated by the different characteristics between family owners in contrast to 
managers that run non- family firms. Both benefits and costs of tax avoidance seem 
greater for family owners than managers. That is because family owners own a larger 
share of the firm and thus the tax savings are very beneficial for them. However, at 
the same time a potential price discount or a reputational damage from being involved 
in a lawsuit have a great cost for them than for CEOs of non- family firms. Therefore, 
family owners analyze and evaluate the tax policy of their company in a much stricter 
way, since the potential profits but also costs are very large. That is why, it is unclear 
whether a family firm would be more or less tax aggressive compare to a non- family 
firm.   
 Chen et al. (2010) conclude in his study that family firms are less tax aggressive 
than their non- family counterparts. At the same conclusion come Anderson and Reeb 
(2003). Anderson and Reeb (2003) notice that family firms have a better performance 
than non- family firms and thus appear to be less tax aggressive.  
 The fact that family firms seem to be less tax aggressive is explained by many 
parameters. First, the longer the investment horizons of owners the less willing they 
are to confront reputational damage from penalties and potential price discount due 
to suspicion of diversion from minority. In general, family firms are willing to forgo tax 
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savings to avoid the associated price discounts (Chen et al., 2010). Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) state that a price discount can arise because minority shareholders 
might presume that tax avoidance activities are a way for family members to mask so 
called rent-seeking. This means that investors are usually protecting themselves 
against this rent extraction, if they assume family firms are conducting family 
entrenchment. 
 In opposition to Andersen and Reeb (2003), who concluded that on average 
family firms perform better than non- family firms, Fama and Jensen (1983) present 
the opinion that family firms and especially their owners and managers may focus on 
serving their incentives and benefits instead of firm’s benefit. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
consider family owners as undiversified shareholders and the all other shareholders 
as diversified shareholders and thus they assume that these two different groups bend 
to different investment plans and decisions. Annuar et al. (2014) seem to agree with 
the analysis of Fama and Jensen (1983) since they propose a positive relation between 
family ownership and tax avoidance conjecturing that the associated costs of tax 
avoidance practices are less than the benefits for family firms in a concentrated 
ownership environment. 
 Analysis and in depth research concerning family ownership structure is 
necessary and very important since family firms represent a 30 % to 40 % of S & P 1500 
firms. The percentage depends on how broad the definition of family ownership that 
each researcher uses in his study.  
 To conclude, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) and Chen et al. (2010) both agree 
that family firms consider both the benefits and costs of tax avoidance before they 
proceed with their tax policy. And although there are contradictory conclusions in the 
existing literature, at most cases it is proposed that family firms are less tax aggressive 
than non- family firms. This section will help to construct the first hypothesis at the 
end of this chapter.  
2.1.3.2 Government ownership structure 
I proceed to the second type of ownership, the government ownership, which includes 
the firms that belong to the ownership of the government or else long- term 
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institutional ownership. As happened with the previous ownership structure, I will 
refer to the previous literature regarding this matter.  
 The government ownership has been researched by Chan et al. (2013) and 
Mahenthiran and Kasipillai (2012). Chan et al. (2013) find that in comparison to 
government-controlled firms, non-government-controlled firms are more tax 
aggressive, and therefore the tax avoidance of government control firms is lower. On 
the other hand, Mahenthiran and Kasipillai (2012) find that governmental owned firms 
in Malaysia have a lower effective tax rate, assuming therefore that government 
ownership structures enhance tax avoidance. Some other noteworthy contributions 
in the research of government ownership have been conducted by Zeng (2011), who 
finds that government controlled firms are less tax aggressive compared with non-
government controlled firms and Wu et al. (2013), who also provide evidence that 
local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) pay a higher level of tax than private firms. 
Finally, Khurana and Moser (2009) find that firms with higher levels of long-term 
institutional ownership are less tax aggressive because institutional owners are more 
concerned with the long-term consequences of aggressive tax strategy. 
 In more detail, Chan et al. (2013) focus on the influence of government 
ownership, corporate governance and their interactions on tax aggressiveness. They 
come to the conclusion that managers of government-controlled firms are more eager 
to achieve the political objective of protecting government revenue in their tax 
strategy and thus they force their companies to avoid aggressive tax planning. 
However, Chan et al. (2013) don’t manage to figure out whether the executives of 
government- controlled firms benefit and promote their careers by making generous 
tax payments and call for further research on this matter.  
 A different approach is presented in the study of Bradshaw et al. (2014). 
Bradshaw et al. perceive taxes as an implicit dividend to the controlling shareholder. 
Thus, they argue that less tax avoidance benefits the controlling shareholder of state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) and reflects an implicit expropriation of wealth from other 
shareholders. Therefore, they state that managers of SOEs tend to prioritize the 
controlling shareholder’s interest, that is the state, and engage in less tax avoidance. 
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Managers are concerned above all for their career, which they protect and promote 
by accommodating the controlling shareholder’s interest, even though that is almost 
always costly to minority shareholders. Due to this fact, managers of SOEs have less 
incentives for better financial results and higher net income. This fact is pointed out 
in the studies of Djankov and Murrell (2002) and Sun and Tong (2003).  
 As it is apparent from the above, most of the studies so far have abstracted 
their data from markets of Eastern countries such as China, Malaysia etc. regarding 
the research on government ownership. However, government ownership holds a 
fairly large proportion of corporate ownership also in Western countries and therefore 
breaches the need for research.  Because of this fact, a study that abstracts data from 
Greek market, as this one, will be a major and important contribution to the research 
field of government ownership.  
2.1.3.3 Foreign ownership structure 
The third and last ownership structure that I will examine in this study in relation with 
tax avoidance, is foreign ownership. Foreign ownership is generated by foreign 
investment made by a company or an individual in one country with business interests 
in another country, in the form of either establishing business operations or acquiring 
business assets in the other country, such as ownership or controlling interest in a 
foreign company. The key feature of foreign investment is that it is an investment 
made that establishes either effective control of, or at least substantial influence over, 
the decision making of a foreign business2(Huizinga and Nicodeme, 2005) 
 
 Foreign ownership of shares has been associated with high profitability and 
efficiency but also has been linked with the presence of tax aggressive practices 
(Christensen & Murphy, 2004; Annuar, Salihu and Obid, 2014). By general agreement 
the foreign ownership structure is a field that require further and more in depth 
research (Annuar, Salihu and Obid, 2014). As Huizinga and Nicodeme (2005) state in 
their study, foreign ownership allows countries to effectively export part of their 
                                                          
2 www.investopedia.com  
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corporate tax burden leading to imposition of relatively high corporate taxes in 
countries with high foreign ownership.  
The diffusion of foreign corporate ownership was assisted by the elimination 
of capital controls in industrialized countries, the abolishment of all restrictions on 
capital outflows in EU and the institutionalization of free movement of capital in the 
framework of the European Union (Huizinga and Nicodeme, 2005). Huizinga and 
Nicodeme (2005) calculated the asset-weighted foreign ownership share to be 19.4 
percent in Western Europe in 2000, while it stood at 32.9 percent in Eastern Europe. 
They also noticed that during the period 1996–2000, while the average foreign 
ownership in Western Europe have been rather stable, it had significantly increased 
in Eastern Europe.  Their empirical analysis suggests that corporate tax levels are 
positively related to country-level foreign ownership shares and the effect is 
economically significant. More specifically, an increase in foreign ownership by one 
percentage point is estimated to increase the average capital income tax rate between 
a half and one percent. The results of Huizinga’s and Nicodeme’s empirical analysis 
made it clear that foreign ownership depicts a large proportion of the overall market 
and economy and it is worth to be studied further.  
There are and some other studies regarding foreign ownership that are worth 
mentioned. Such as Grubert et al. (1993) who notices that foreign-controlled US 
corporations pay lower US taxes than purely domestic firms based on tax-return data. 
Kinney and Lawrence (2000) also find that foreign firms pay relatively low taxes in the 
US. These authors attributed the low taxes paid by the foreign investors to the fact 
that they tend to take over relatively unprofitable US firms. Demirguc- Kunt and 
Huizinga (2001) abstracted their data from eighty countries across the globe and 
concluded that foreign-owned banks pay relatively lower taxes than their domestic 
counterparts in the host countries. Even though this study by Demirguc- Kunt and 
Huizinga (2001) shade light into the effects of foreign ownership on tax avoidance, 
and the very broad and large sample of data, the findings cannot be generalized, since 
it is limited to the banking sector.  
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 To summarize, all the insights from the above-mentioned literature concerning 
the affiliation between foreign ownership structure and corporate tax avoidance will 
help to construct the third hypothesis of this study.  
3 Theory  
In this chapter, will be presented the theory that complements corporate ownership 
structures and corporate tax policies. I will refer to theories that have been expressed 
through the last decades. Through this presentation and combination of theories, it 
will be easy to observe the progress that has been made in theory throughout the 
years. This will help in developing the hypotheses that answer the research question.  
3.1 Agency theory  
I will present and discuss the theory that is considered as the most significant and 
commonly accepted theory explaining the affiliation between corporate ownership 
structures and corporate tax avoidance, the agency theory. 
Agency theory is used as a tool to interpret and understand the relationships between 
agents and principals. The most common agency relationship in finance occurs 
between shareholders (principal) and company executives (agents). Agency theory 
addresses problems that arise due to differences between the goals or desires 
between the principal and agent. Agency theory is concerned with resolving problems 
that can exist in agency relationships due to unaligned goals or different aversion 
levels to risk3 (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
 The link between agency theory and the explanation for tax avoidance has 
been made since early 1970’s. The classic article of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
resulted in much theoretical and empirical analysis on why and to what extent an 
individual would evade taxes. They concluded that to promote an efficient allocation 
of resources, taxes should be levied primarily on commodities that are inelastic in 
demand or supply. However, they admitted that their models were rather simplistic 
and acknowledge the need for further research, both theoretical and empirical.  
                                                          
3 www.investopedia.com  
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 Fama and Jensen (1983) were the first to build the theoretical framework by 
which tax avoidance is interpreted based around the agency theory. In their study 
“Agency problems and residual claims” (1983) they stated that agency problems arise 
from the stage of the contracts, which are not costlessly written and enforced. The 
contract structures of organizations limit the risks undertaken most agents by 
specifying either fixed payoffs or incentive payoffs tied specific measures of 
performance. However, the residual risk -the risk of the difference between stochastic 
inflows of resources and promised payments to agents- still remains in the cases of 
those who according to the contract have rights to net cash. These are the cases of 
the common stock residual claims of open corporations and these agents are called 
residual claimants or residual. And this is where the problem of separation of 
"ownership" and "control"-more precisely, the separation of residual risk bearing from 
decision functions- arises, since the decision process is in the hands of professional 
managers whose interests are not identical to those of residual claimants.  
In another study of theirs “Separation of ownership and control” (1983) Fama 
and Jensen tried to explain the survival of organizations in which important decision 
agents are not the major residual claimants and therefore do not bear a substantial 
share of the wealth effects of their decisions. They come to the conclusion that 
without effective control procedures, such decision managers are more likely to take 
actions that deviate from the interests of residual claimants. Thus, they argue that an 
effective system for decision control implies, that the control (ratification and 
monitoring) of decisions is to some extent separate from the management (initiation 
and implementation) of decisions. To some extent individual decision agents can be 
involved in the management of some decisions and the control of others, however 
separation demands that an individual agent does not exercise exclusive management 
and control rights over the same decisions.  
 In a more recent study, Badertscher et al. (2013), based on the theoretical 
framework of Fama and Jensen, end up with results that are consistent with their 
expectations and the results of previous studies. More specifically, they argue that 
because tax avoidance is a risky activity that can impose significant costs on a firm, 
firms with greater concentrations of ownership and control, and thus more risk averse 
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managers, avoid less income tax than firms with less concentrated ownership and 
control. 
 Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) and Rego and Wilson (2012), also make 
references in their studies concerning agency theory and its link with corporate tax 
avoidance. They also stated that tax avoidance is a risky activity in which undiversified, 
risk averse managers will minimize their investments. Tax avoidance is a policy which 
can impose significant costs on firms and their managers, including fees paid to tax 
experts, time devoted to their solution of tax audits, reputational penalties, and 
penalties paid to tax authorities (Rego and Wilson, 2012). Thus, they conclude that 
risk-averse owner-managers likely prefer to undertake less risky tax planning, while 
relatively risk-neutral shareholders prefer managers to implement all tax strategies 
that are expected to increase firm value, regardless of risk. Following this rationale, 
the connection between tax avoidance and risk-averse managers becomes obvious. 
And consequently, the connection between tax avoidance and ownership structures 
is being made too.   
 Crocker and Slemrod (2004) studied corporate tax evasion in the context of the 
contractual relationship between the shareholders of a firm and the chief financial 
officer (CFO), who determines the firm’s deductions from taxable corporate income. 
They took as granted the fact that CFO possesses private information regarding the 
extent of legally permissible reductions in taxable income, and may also inflate the 
size of the firm’s tax shield through illegal evasion. They found out that the incentives 
of the CFO to engage in tax evasion are affected by the nature of his compensation 
arrangement and that penalties imposed on the CFO directly are more effective in 
reducing evasion than are those imposed on shareholders. 
 Many of the issues and theories regarding agency theory have direct 
communication with the theory concerning corporate governance. Thus, in the next 
paragraph, I will refer to the issue of corporate governance and its connection to the 
tax avoidance.  
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3.2 Corporate governance 
This subparagraph is going to be about corporate governance and how and in what 
extent influences tax avoidance. Corporate governance is also one of the key elements 
in comprehending and analysing corporate ownership structure. Many theories have 
been expresses on this matter and many studies have references regarding corporate 
governance. These studies will be cited and analysed in the following paragraphs.  
 Corporate governance is the system of rules, practices and processes by which 
a company is directed and controlled. Corporate governance essentially involves 
balancing the interests of a company's many stakeholders, such as shareholders, 
management, customers, suppliers, financiers, government and the community. 
Corporate governance refers specifically to the set of rules, controls, policies and 
resolutions put in place to dictate corporate behaviour (Investopedia). Desai et al. 
(2007), Minnick and Noga (2010) and Lanis and Richardson (2011) are only some of 
the studies that have been concerned with corporate governance.  
 Desai et al. (2007) analyse the interaction between corporate taxes and 
corporate governance. They manage to show by using cross-country data on tax 
changes that the design of the corporate tax system affects the amount of private 
benefits extracted by company insiders and that the quality of the corporate 
governance system affects the sensitivity of tax revenues to tax changes. Minnick and 
Noga (2010) refer further to the role of corporate governance in long run tax 
management and based on their data-analysis they conclude that companies with 
smaller, more independent boards, less entrenched management, and higher CEO and 
director pay-performance sensitivity influence tax management. They deconstruct the 
effective tax rate into its individual components and by using these individual 
components, they document how companies manage their tax rates and how the 
governance affect these individual components. Finally, Lanis and Richardson (2011) 
focus more on how the composition of the board of directors affect corporate tax 
aggressiveness.  
 Another worth- mentioned study on this matter is this of Mahenthiran and 
Kasipillai (2012). They abstracted their data from the Malaysian market and based on 
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their data analysis of 345 public listed companies, they find out that we find that 
government ownership, management power, and total accruals are important 
determinants of companies’ effective tax rates. Furthermore, their results imply that 
companies that mitigate the agency conflicts with lower total accruals are more likely 
to have lower effective tax rates, and executive compensation is a good predictor of 
long-term tax planning by public listed companies. 
4 Hypotheses  
In this chapter, I will discuss and display the hypotheses that help answering the 
research question. The hypotheses are based on and built on the theory, definitions 
and concepts that are mentioned in the three previous chapters. As it is mentioned in 
the beginning, this study seeks to answer what is the effect of corporate ownership 
structure on corporate tax avoidance. The primary and most important theory is the 
agency theory which is going to be used as an anchor for this study, since it manages 
to explain the affiliation between corporate ownership, corporate governance and tax 
avoidance. It addresses the problems between shareholders and company executives. 
The two most important factors affecting corporate tax avoidance on which I relied to 
construct the hypotheses is the levels of managers’ risk aversion and how this is linked 
with the separations of ownership and control.  
 The first ownership structure is family ownership. As it is stated in the 
literature review family-owned firms originate a greater agency conflict between large 
and minority shareholders when at the same time, they originate a lesser agency 
conflict between owners and managers in comparison to non- family forms (Chen et 
al. 2010). The fact that family-owned firms seems to be less tax aggressive can be 
attributed to many parameters. The main reason is that the longer the investment 
horizons of owners the less willing they are to confront reputational damage and 
penalties imposed by the IRS or a potential price discount because of suspicion of 
diversion of minority (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). It is observed that family owners 
analyse and evaluate the company’s tax policy in a much stricter way since the 
potential costs are very large. Anderson and Reeb (2003) suggest that on average 
family firms perform better in comparison to non-family firms while on the other 
hand, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that family owners may focus on serving their 
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own incentives and benefits instead of firm’s benefits. Annuar et al. (2014) seems to 
agree with the analysis of Fama and Jensen due to the undiversified ownership 
environment in family-owned firms. Although there are some contradictory 
conclusions, most of the existing literature (Chen et al., 2010; Anderson and Reeb, 
1983; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006) agrees that family firms are less tax- aggressive 
than non-family firms.   
1st hypothesis: Firms with family ownership are less tax-aggressive than non-family 
ownership firms. 
 The second form of ownership structure is the government ownership. In the 
corresponding section in the literature review, the conclusions of the existing 
literature are highly contradictory. Chan et al. (2013) find that government- controlled 
firms are less tax aggressive. As opposed to Chen et al., Mahenthiran and Kasipillai 
(2012) argue that government ownership structures enhance tax avoidance. Khurana 
and Moser (2009) report that firms with higher levels of institutional ownership tend 
to be less tax aggressive because institutional owners are more concerned with the 
long-term consequences of company’s tax policy. Zeng (2011) and Wu et al. (2013) 
also provide evidence that state-owned enterprises are less tax aggressive in 
comparison to non-government controlled enterprises and also, they state that 
government-controlled firms pay a higher level of tax than private firms. Based on this 
rationale, which seems to dominate and expecting that in Greece this pattern is more 
likely to take place, I assume that government ownership is more likely to have a 
negative effect on tax avoidance policies.  
2nd hypothesis: Government- controlled firms are less likely to enhance tax avoidance.  
 The last ownership structure is the foreign ownership. As it is mentioned in the 
related section, the existing literature is not as broad and extensive as is regarding the 
other two ownership structures. Per Christensen and Murphy (2004) and Annuar, 
Salihu and Obid (2014) foreign ownership seems to relate to tax aggressive practises. 
Grubert et al. (1993) and Kinney and Lawrence (2000) also conclude that foreign-
owned firm seem to engage to tax aggressive policies since they pay relatively lower 
taxes than domestic enterprises in the US.  On the same conclusions come Demirguc- 
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Kunt and Huizinga (2001) who have a very large data sample. However, their results 
cannot be generalised, since their study is limited to the banking sector. From the 
existing literature, even though it is not very broad, it is obvious that foreign-owned 
firms tend to be more tax aggressive than domestic firms.   
3rd hypothesis: Foreign ownership is more likely to be related to tax avoidance.  
5 Research methodology  
In this section I will draw the picture of the research methodology. The research 
method consists of two core parts, the sample selection and the empirical framework. 
The part of sample selection includes the procedure that was followed to gather the 
data while the empirical framework includes the empirical guidelines and conceptual 
stage used in prior literature. In that way, the conduction of the research and the 
rationale of the variables becomes easier perceptible.  
5.1 Sample selection  
The sample of this research is a sample of Greek firms, over the period of four years-
2012-2014. The origin of the firms has chosen to be Greek, because to my best 
knowledge, there has been no similar research regarding the area of Greece. The 
results can provide insights and understanding regarding the interaction of ownership 
structure and tax avoidance in the Western market in the wider context and in the 
south-east Europe more specifically.  
 Similar studies have been conducted in other countries such as Malaysia 
(Bradshaw, Liao, Ma,2014), China (Chan et al., 2013). However, their results and 
conclusions are not transferable to the Western market, making it necessary and 
claimable to conduct comparable studies in Western market.  
 Regarding the timeframe, 2012-2015, I concluded in these years for several 
reasons. First and most important of all is the call from previous literature and need 
for further and more recent researches (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010).  Furthermore, I 
wanted to study how the period of the Greek financial crisis, which was more intense 
these last four years, interacted with ownership structure and tax avoidance. All things 
considered this quadrennium has adequate data availability.   
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 The data was gathered through archival database research, mainly through 
Amadeus database by Bureau van Dijk, accesses via VPN connection with the 
International Hellenic University. Amadeus is a pan-European database which 
contains financial information for public and private companies. Therefore, it contains 
the information that I required regarding the Greek listed companies.  
I focused on listed firms mainly because the financial data are more complete 
and adequate. The initial sample consisted of 812 listed firms with 7290 firm-year 
observations. The exact sample selection of this stage is depicted in table 1. The next 
step was to exclude 68 listed firms and to take out 612 firm-year observations due to 
lack of ownership structure data. Thus, our final sample is consisted of 744 listed firms 
and 6678 firm- year observations.  
5.2 Ownership distribution   
Table 1 shows the distribution into ownership structures. As it is obvious from the 
table, more than 70% of the sample appertain to one of the three ownership structure. 
The family ownership structure is distinctly the dominant one and the foreign 
ownership structure follows. The sample of government ownership is not very large 
and I had second thoughts on whether I should include this ownership structure into 
the statistical analysis. Finally, it was included into the data analysis however, the fact 
that the sample is small will be considered into the results discussion.    
 A significant section of this study is the classification of the firms into the three 
different ownership structures. For this classification, I was based on prior literature. 
Regarding family ownership, Chen et al. (2010) states three criteria and if one is met 
then the firm is classified as a family-owned. The criteria are the following: the 
founding family holds more than 50% of the outstanding shares, founding family 
members or successors still hold more than 5% of the shares outstanding or founding 
family members or successors still hold positions on the board. My sample includes 
460 family firms with 4129 firm-year observations. 
 The classification regarding government ownership is based also on prior 
literature and more specifically on the papers of Chan et al. (2013) and Bradshaw et 
al. (2016) in which the state- owned enterprises are being studied. The classification 
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criteria for these enterprises are the two followings, as stated in the two fore 
mentioned studies: either the government holds more than 50% of the shares or is 
the major block holder of the firm. Based on these criteria, my sample includes 20 
state-owned firms with 179 firm-year observations. 
 The last ownership structure about foreign ownership is the least studied 
ownership structure. For the classification criteria, I was based on the papers of 
Annuar et al. (2014), Huizinga and Nicodeme (2006) and Egger et al. (2010). In these 
studies, it is stated that a firm is classified as foreign when foreigners hold more than 
50% of the shares or are the major block holders of the firm. My sample includes per 
these criteria 48 foreign-controlled firms with 431 firm-year observations.  
 The procedure that I followed in order to gather the data begin with the 
Bureau van Dijk database from where I downloaded the financial data considering 
taxation, net income, intangible fixed assets, long term debt, market capitalization, 
shareholders’ funds, total assets, fixed assets and profit and losses before tax which 
where necessary for the calculation of the variables. The next step was to download 
the data regarding the shareholder’s structure for each firm from the website of the 
Athens stock exchange. At this point, I had gathered the majority of the data however 
I had to compare the ownership structure data with the afore-mentioned classification 
criteria in order to conclude on whether a firm is family-owned, state-owned or 
foreign-controlled. The necessary information for this classification was gathered from 
the websites of each firm. This final search on the shareholders’ structure and 
founders’ data to every firm’s website allowed me to complete my data selection.   
 However, as it is depictured in Table 1 below, during the process I had to take 
out a number of firms and observations due to absence of financial data. More 
specifically, 15 family firms (135 firm year observations), 4 foreign firms (36 firm year 
observations) and 1 firm (9 firm year observations) from the class of other ownership 
were excluded in order for the final data sample to be complete.  
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Table 1 # of firms final # of 
firms 
percentage # of firm 
years 
Final # of 
firm years 
Family ownership  460 445 61,83% 4140 4005 
Government 
ownership  
20 20 2,69% 180 180 
Foreign 
ownership 
48 44 6,45% 432 396 
Other ownership 216 215 29,00% 1944 1935 
TOTAL  744 724 100,00% 6696 6516 
  
 
5.3 Research design  
In this section I will present the research design of this study by introducing the 
measure of tax avoidance and by providing clarifications regarding the research model 
and the control variables. The statistical analysis is conducted by using SPSS (Superior 
Performance Software System).  
5.3.1 Tax avoidance measurement 
Effective tax rate is the measurement of tax avoidance that I use in this study. Effective 
tax rate is a commonly held tax avoidance measurement in prior literature. It is 
considered reliable and most of the exemplary studies regarding tax avoidance rely on 
this measurement to measure actual tax rates (Chen et al, 2010; Mahenthiran and 
Kasipillai, 2012; Bradshaw et al, 2016). However, there are times in already existing 
literature, where different tax avoidance measurements are being used. Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010) accumulate and present most of the tax avoidance measurements 
and discuss the pros and cons of each measurement in their study «A review of tax 
research».  
 I concluded that the most appropriate measure of tax avoidance measurement 
regarding the Greek market is the effective tax rate, defined as taxation divided with 
net income before tax. In other comparative studies, effective tax rate is defined as 
total income tax expense divided by total pre-tax accounting income or as cash taxes 
paid divided by total pre-tax accounting income. In general, there are many ways to 
define effective tax rate based on prior literature according to the situation.   Whether 
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the results would be different if I had used a different definition of effective tax rate, 
can be defined and resolved by future research.  
 Tables 2, 3 and 4 below show the means and significance for the effective tax 
rate and the control variables separated for the three ownership structures.  
Family (1) vs. Non Family (0) 
Table 2 N Mean t Test Sig (95%) 
BIG4 
0 279 0.37 
8.232 0.000 
1 445 0.12 
SIZE 
0 279 3.4834 
7.900 0.000 
1 445 2.2883 
ROA 
0 279 -0.0392 
1.154 0.249 
1 445 -0.0777 
LEV 
0 279 0.2056 
-0.468 0.640 
1 445 0.21254 
MB 
0 279 -0.0336 
-0.037 0.970 
1 445 -0.0321 
CAPITINT 
0 279 0.54407 
-0.515 0.607 
1 445 0.55264 
INTANG 
0 279 0.21806 
1.860 0.063 
1 445 0.1011 
ETR 
0 279 0.2795 
-0.877 0.381 
1 445 1.16578 
 
In more detail, in table 2 it become obvious that the difference between family and 
non-family firms is statistically significant only concerning the variables SIZE and BIG4, 
where the p-value is lower that 0.05 (grey cells). Regarding the ETR, there is no 
statistically significant difference between family and non-family firms. 
 
 
 
 
Government (1) vs. Non-Government (0) 
Table 3 N Mean t Test Sig (95%) 
BIG4 
0 704 0.21 
-1.979 0.048 
1 20 0.4 
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SIZE 
0 704 2.6559 
-7.476 0.000 
1 20 6.0299 
ROA 
0 704 -0.0661 
-4.997 0.000 
1 20 0.04995 
LEV 
0 704 0.21009 
0.213 0.833 
1 20 0.20195 
MB 
0 704 -0.0337 
-1.738 0.083 
1 20 0.00121 
CAPITINT 
0 704 0.54717 
-1.998 0.059 
1 20 0.6254 
INTANG 
0 704 0.15025 
4.682 0.000 
1 20 0.00269 
ETR 
0 704 0.8408 
0.943 0.346 
1 20 0.24146 
 
In table 3, where the government ownership structure is analysed, the difference 
between government and non-government controlled firms is statistically significant 
regarding the control variables BIG4, ROA, SIZE and INTANG (grey cells), where the p-
value is lower than 0.05. And in this ownership structure as in the previous one, the 
difference regarding ETR is not statistically significant. 
Foreign (1) vs. Domestic (0) 
Table 4 N Mean t Test Sig (95%) 
BIG4 
0 680 0.18 
-12.567 0.000 
1 44 0.91 
SIZE 
0 680 2.6285 
-6.342 0.000 
1 44 4.6121 
ROA 
0 680 -0.0659 
-1.866 0.063 
1 44 -0.0155 
LEV 
0 680 0.21019 
0.215 0.830 
1 44 0.20487 
MB 
0 680 -0.0346 
-1.429 0.153 
1 44 -0.004 
CAPITINT 
0 680 0.54153 
-3.477 0.001 
1 44 0.66993 
INTANG 
0 680 0.14625 
0.027 0.978 
1 44 0.14499 
ETR 
0 680 0.81198 
-0.171 0.864 
1 44 1.01388 
 
In table 4, the case of foreign vs. domestic firms is tested. In this case, the difference 
is statistically significant regarding the BIG4, SIZE and CAPITINT variables (grey cells). 
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However, again in this case the difference concerning ETR is not statistically 
significant.  
 Summarizing, the results regarding ETR are not significant in none of the three 
ownership structures and thus, the hypotheses cannot be tested. The most likely is 
that the effective tax rate as a measure of tax avoidance does not work in Greek 
market, it is not capable to depict the economy size of tax avoidance in Greece, despite 
the fact that it has worked in other countries in comparable studies (Chen et al, 2010; 
Mahenthiran and Kasipillai, 2012; Bradshaw et al, 2016; Job Eshuis, 2016).  
5.3.2 Model and variables 
To conclude on my hypotheses, I use the following comparable models. The only 
difference between the three hypotheses is the variable regarding the ownership 
structure. Therefore, the three models only differ in the ownership variable.  
 The first hypotheses tests whether family ownership affect tax avoidance and 
it is expected that family-owned firms will be less tax aggressive that non-family firms. 
The model is the following: 
ETR = βο+β1∙FA+β2∙BIG4 +β3∙SIZE+β4∙ROA+β5∙LEV+β6∙ΜΒ+β7∙CAPITINT+β8∙INTANG+ ε 
 The second hypotheses test the affiliation between government ownership 
and tax avoidance and it is expected to conclude that government-controlled firms are 
less likely to enhance tax avoidance. The used model is the following: 
ETR = βο+β1∙GO+β2∙BIG4 +β3∙SIZE+β4∙ROA+β5∙LEV+β6∙ΜΒ+β7∙CAPITINT+β8∙INTANG+ ε 
 
 The third and final hypothesis seeks to explain the relationship between 
foreign ownership and corporate tax avoidance. The expectation is that foreign forms 
are more likely to be related with tax avoidance. The used model follows:  
ETR = βο+β1∙FOR+β2∙BIG4 +β3∙SIZE+β4∙ROA+β5∙LEV+β6∙ΜΒ+β7∙CAPITINT+β8∙INTANG+ ε 
 The three models have the same control variables and only differ in the 
ownership variable. The control variables are all been extracted from prior literature 
(e.g. Annuar et al., 2014; Badertscher et al., 2013; Bradshaw et al., 2016; Chan et al., 
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2013; Chen et al., 2010; Dyreng et al., 2008; Grubert et al., 1993; Hope et al., 2013; 
Huizinga and Nicodeme, 2006; Langli and Saudagaran, 2004; Mahenthiran and 
Kasipillai, 2012). 
 I will proceed by explaining the control variables. The control variable SIZE is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of the market capitalization and it is included based 
on the hypothesis that larger firms might enjoy privileges due to economics of scale 
(Bradshaw et al., 2016). The second variable is ROA and it controls the profitability of 
firms since the higher the return on assets, the higher the inducement to enhance tax 
avoidance policies. ROA is measured as operating profit divided by total assets. The 
next variable, leverage (LEV), is included to control whether there are tax incentives 
rising from debt financing and it is measured by dividing total long-term debt by total 
assets. The MB variable is included to control for a firm’s growth since the growth of 
a firm might alter the firm’s tax policy and enhance incentives for tax avoidance.  
Market-to-book ratio is calculated by dividing the market capitalization by the 
shareholders’ funds. The CAP_INT variable measures the capital intensity. The variable 
is calculated by dividing fixed assets by total assets and along with the INTANG 
variable, which is calculated by dividing intangibles by total assets, controls for 
differences in the assets since those alterations might affect the tax incentives. There 
is also a dummy variable BIG4 in place, which equals 1 if a firm is audited by a big 4 
company and zero otherwise. 
5.3.2.1 Linear regression of the three models 
 
CASE 1: Family vs. Non-Family 
 Coefficients-Table A 
 Coeff (β) t statistic Sig.(p val) VIF 
(Constant) 2.319 1.108 .268   
OS1_FA .580 .428 .669 1.144 
BIG4 .337 .200 .841 1.281 
SIZE -.313 -.918 .359 1.302 
ROA .214 .186 .852 1.020 
LEV 6.530 2.020 .044 1.053 
MB .211 .179 .858 1.011 
CAPITINT -4.360 -1.481 .139 1.078 
INTANG -.138 -.184 .854 1.011 
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Model Summary-Table B 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .100a .010 -.001 16.5845 
 
ANOVA-Table C 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.(p val) 
1 Regression 1966.683 8 245.835 .894 0.521 
Residual 196656.851 715 275.045     
Total 198623.535 723       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D 
 
 
Figure E 
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CASE 2: Government vs. Non-Government 
 
Coefficients-Table A 
 Coeff (β) t statistic Sig.(p val) VIF 
(Constant) 2.778 1.498 .135 
 
OS2_GO .914 .234 .815 1.082 
BIG4 .209 .126 .899 1.231 
SIZE -.361 -1.043 .297 1.345 
ROA .215 .187 .852 1.020 
LEV 6.530 2.020 .044 1.054 
MB .230 .195 .845 1.010 
CAPITINT -4.293 -1.461 .144 1.074 
INTANG -.155 -.207 .836 1.008 
 
Model Summary-Table B 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .099 .010 -.001 16.585960 
 
ANOVA- Table C 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.(p val) 
1 Regression 1931.271 8 241.409 .878 .535 
Residual 196692.264 715 275.094     
Total 198623.535 723       
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Figure D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure E 
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CASE 3: Foreign vs. Domestic 
Coefficients- Table A 
 Coeff (β) t statistic Sig.(p val) VIF 
(Constant) 2.830 1.526 .127   
OS3_FOR 1.609 .561 .575 1.235 
BIG4 -.172 -.097 .923 1.416 
SIZE -.350 -1.045 .296 1.259 
ROA .214 .186 .852 1.020 
LEV 6.561 2.029 .043 1.054 
MB .230 .194 .846 1.010 
CAPITINT -4.433 -1.503 .133 1.083 
INTANG -.158 -.210 .834 1.007 
 
 
 
 
Model Summary-Table B 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 0.1 .010 -.001 16.58294 
 
 
 
ANOVA- Table C 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.(p val) 
1 Regression 2002.885 8 250.361 .910 0.507 
Residual 196620.649 715 274.994     
Total 198623.535 723       
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Figure E 
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In this section I present and discuss the results of this study, which are depicted in the 
tables above. In all three cases the only coefficient of the model that is statistically 
significant is LEV since only LEV has p-value lower than 0.05 (table A in all three cases).  
 Furthermore, from table B in all three cases it becomes obvious that the model 
cannot explain efficiently the variance of the ETR, since the R-Square has a value of 
0.01. This value means that the independent variables can explain sufficiently only 1% 
of the variance of the dependent variable ETR. Table C shows that in percentage 95%, 
the model cannot offer statistically significant projections regarding ETR, since the p-
value is over 0.05.  
 Concerning the existence of collinearity, the values of variance inflation factor 
in table A are all smaller than 10, which means that collinearity does not exists. 
However, there is significant problem with normality and the outliers as it is obvious 
from figures D and E. Even if I take out some extreme observations, the problem does 
not seem to be solved.  
 All in all, the results of the linear regression are unable to verify the hypotheses 
of this study in any of the three cases.  
6 Conclusion 
This study examines how three types of ownership structure influences corporate tax 
aggressiveness. The three ownership structures are family ownership, government 
ownership and foreign ownership. Different types of ownership structure have been 
proved by prior literature to provide different incentives regarding tax policy. 
Ownership structure affect tax payments with potential benefits or costs for the 
corporation. The measurement of tax avoidance is also a matter of extensive 
discussion in this study. I concluded in using the effective tax rate measure, a measure 
broadly used in prior literature due to its reliability.  
 Despite the extensive discussion and analysis on prior comparative studies and 
the use of a model and variables that are considered reliable, the results of the study 
are facing significant problems regarding the statistical significance. It shows that the 
model cannot correspond with the data that are provided and that the effective tax 
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rate as a type of tax avoidance measurement cannot provide robust and significant 
results in the context of the Greek market.  
 I arrive at the conclusion that the nature and structure of the Greek market 
and the Greek corporations makes it difficult to provide reliable and credible results.  
Whether the results would be different if I had used a different model or a different 
tax measurement or even a different definition of effective tax rate can be defined 
and resolved by future research. 
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Appendix  
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
ETR Effective tax rate, calculated by dividing taxes paid by 
pretax income. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of the market capitalization 
(market value of equity) 
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ROA Return on assets, calculated by dividing operating 
income by total assets 
LEV Leverage, calculated by dividing long-term debt by 
total assets 
INTANG Intangibles, calculated by dividing intangible assets 
by total assets 
CAPITINT Capital intensity, calculated by dividing fixed assets 
by total assets 
MB Market-to-book ratio, calculated by dividing market 
value of equity by book value of equity. 
BIG4 Indicator variable coded as 1 if a firm is audited by 
one of the Big 4 auditors 
FA Indicator variable coded as 1 if a firm is regarded as 
family firm. A firm is coded as FA if founders/family 
has more than 50% of shares, firms with founding 
equity ownership of more than 5% or firms wherein 
family members are still part of the board 
GO Indicator variable coded as 1 if a firm is regarded a 
government firm. A firm is coded as GO if the 
government holds more than 50% of the shares or is 
the major block holder 
FOR Indicator variable coded as 1 if a firm is regarded a 
foreign firm. A firm is coded as FO if foreigner hold 
more than 50% of the shares or are the major block 
holders 
 
